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The Impact of Employer E-Mail Policies
on Employee Rights to Engage in
Concerted Activities Protected by the
National Labor Relations Act
Christine Neylon O'Brien*
This article addresses the interrelationship of employee rights
to engage in "concerted activities" under Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and employer policies on electronic
mail (e-mail) use. Should traditional labor law rules regarding
solicitation and distribution be applied to e-mail communication?
Does a "business-use-only" e-mail policy avoid legal problems? Is
such a policy practical in light of the pervasive use of e-mail for
general communication? If employers permit selective personal use
of the e-mail system, but prohibit discussions related to a union, or
to wages, hours and working conditions, such discrimination is
legally problematic. Also, employer monitoring of employee e-mail
is a form of surveillance that may be prohibited during a union
organizational campaign. This article analyzes existing case law
interpreting similar issues under the NLRA in light of new issues
arising with e-mail in the workplace. The article concludes with
recommendations for appropriate resolution of the competing
interests of employers, unions, and employees.
I.

Introduction

Pervasive use of e-mail as a means of communication is a fact
of life in the new millennium. Communication in the workplace has
been transformed by the medium. E-mail is quick, efficient, and
has numerous advantages over using the telephone or writing
letters.1 E-mail messaging avoids telephone "tag," reduces paper
* Professor, Business Law, Wallace E. Carroll School of Management,
Boston College. The author wishes to express her appreciation to: Professor David
P. Twomey and Lecturer Margo E.K. Reder, Wallace E. Carroll School of
Management, Boston College, for their research ideas, and to Dominic L. Blue,
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and postage use, and provides a system for saving, commenting
upon, and editing documents.2 Employers are grappling with many
issues when devising policies to regulate or limit e-mail and Internet

use in the workplace. If ever there was a legal minefield for
employers, this is it.
There has been much written about employee use of e-mail in
the workplace generally. Several issues surrounding workplace email are particularly problematic for employers. Employee privacy
issues and employer policies regarding cyber-misconduct by
employees seem to be of current concern to those who shape
workplace rules.' Employers fear incurring liability for employee
breaches against others via e-mail.4 The accessibility of information

that may be damaging to the company during the discovery phase
of litigation is yet another worry for employers, as is the danger of
trade secret disclosure. It is no wonder that employers have
implemented policies regulating e-mail use, and that they also

monitor employee use with an eye toward preventing abuse of the
system.
The right to free speech and the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures of information do not provide
private sector employees much protection with regards to
workplace e-mail messages. This results from the fact that the

federal Constitution does not protect private sector employees in
the same way that it protects government employees

If a private

M.B.A./J.D. candidate at Boston College, for his research assistance.
1. See John Araneo, Note, Pandora's(E-Mail) Box: E-Mail Monitoring in the
Workplace, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 339, 340-41 & n.15 (1996) (noting e-mail
combines immediacy of telephone with thoroughness of letter).
2. See Christopher S. Miller & Brian D. Poe, Employment Law Implications
in the Controland Monitoring of E-mail Systems, 6 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 95, 97
(1997).
3. For a broad treatment of employer e-mail issues, see Mark E. Schreiber,
Employer E-Mail and Internet Risks, Policy Guidelines and Investigations, 85
MASS. L. REV. 74 (2000). See also Patrick Boyd, Tipping the Balance of Power:
Employer Intrusion on Employee Privacy Through Technological Innovation, 14
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 181, 183 (1999) (noting employee right of privacy
limited in private sector workplace); Margo E. K. Reder & Christine Neylon
O'Brien, Corporate Cybersmear: Employers File John Doe Defamation Lawsuits
Seeking the Identity of Anonymous Employee Internet Posters, 8 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 2 (2002) (focusing on anonymous speech by
company employees who post negative comments about their employers on the
Internet).
4. See Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Cyberspace Harassment,2 EMP. DISCRIM. L.
268 (2000) (discussing employer liability for sexual harassment).
5. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE & OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 164 (1999)
(discussing free speech rights in public sector); DAVID P. TWOMEY, LABOR &
EMPLOYMENT LAW 614 (11th ed. 2001) (discussing searches on company property

2002]

EMPLOYER E-MAIL POLICIES

sector employer perceives the content of employee e-mail as
disloyal, distracting, or counterproductive to the employer's
mission, there is little to prevent the employer from exercising its
common law right to terminate an at-will employee.6 The employer
may perceive it to be in the best interest of the business to cut loose
such negative actors, and absent some statutory or contractual
prohibition, the employer is likely to do so. Employers generally
own the computer, maintain the network from which e-mail
messages are sent and maintain the servers, a limited resource.
Unless altered by some overriding public policy concern, the right
to regulate matter sent and stored via e-mail flows from the
employer's inherent property rights in the physical plant and
electronic communication system. In addition, statutory provisions
protect the employers' right to supervise its communication
systems. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
contains exceptions for monitoring workplace communications of
both private and public sector employees, based upon consent.8
These exceptions have been interpreted to permit "ordinary course
of business" review of telephone activity, but do not necessarily
permit extensive surveillance of personal calls.9
In the public sector, the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides some limited privacy protection to
employees, but not such as to defeat the employer's reasonable
need to supervise and control within the "operational realities" of a
workplace."° With respect to e-mail monitoring, prior warning of
the surveillance generally suffices to defeat an expectation of
by private sector employers).

See also STUART J. KAPLAN, E-MAIL POLICIES IN

THE PUBLIC SECTOR WORKPLACE: BALANCING MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES
WITH EMPLOYEE PRIVACY INTERESTS, 15 LERC Monograph Ser. 103 (1998), at

http://library.ukc.ac.uk/library/info/subjectg/law/wljls-km.htm (discussing e-mail
policies in public sector workplace).
6. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)(b)-(d)
(1986) (amended 1994), contains exceptions for monitoring in the "ordinary course
of business" where the employee has consented. "Consent" is usually obtained by
employers at the start of employment, and it may be a prerequisite to access to the
employer' e-mail system.
7. See generally Frederick D. Rapone, Jr., This Is Not Your Grandfather's
Labor Union-Or Is It? Exercising Section 7 Rights in the Cyberspace Age, 39
DuQ. L. REV. 657, 667 (2001) (noting employer's property interest in plant not
entirely dispositive of the lawfulness of a given plant rule).
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(b)-(d).
9. See Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992) (involving
employer's excessive surveillance of employee's personal telephone calls not
protected by "consent" and "ordinary course of business" exceptions since
monitoring not limited to that necessary for legitimate business reasons).
10. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987).
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privacy, and thus, even public sector employee e-mail communication is far from protected. Ironically, in this cyber-tech era, New
Deal labor laws may provide some shield from unreasonable email-related discipline or discharge in the workplace even where
the workplace or employee in question is nonunion."
II.

Concerted Activities: Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act

This article focuses on the labor law aspect of the legal
environment employers face when they implement workplace email policies. Employee Section 7 rights under the National Labor

Relations Act (NLRA) clearly impact employer rights to regulate

e-mail use. 2 The "netscape" navigated here is that which relates to
employee rights to act collectively for mutual aid or protection,

sometimes through the vehicle of unionization, and at other times,
through discussion with co-worker(s) in the absence of a union."
Employees have the right not to be discriminated against by their
employer for engaging in discussions relating to wages, hours, and
working conditions; assuming that the discussions do not violate a
legitimate employer policy regarding use of work time or work
equipment.
A legitimate policy is defined as one that is
nondiscriminatory.'4 For example, an employer may not allow
solicitation of Girl Scout cookie sales (assuming that this is a non11. Employees who are not members of a labor organization also have the
right to engage in concerted activity. See Northeastern Univ., 235 N.L.R.B. 858,
865 (1978); Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
12. Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all such activities....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
13. See Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations
Act in Cyberspace: Union Organizingin Electronic Workplaces, 49 KAN. L. REV. 1
(2000) (discussing transformation of workplace by electronic communication and
implications for union organizing); see generally Elena N. Broder, (Net)workers'
Rights: The NLRA and Employee Electronic Communications, 105 YALE L.J. 1639,
1642 (1996) (discussing NLRA issues relating to workers in cyberspace, whom the
author refers to as (net)workers).
14. Non-work-related activity that is given preference over non-work-related
"concerted activity" may give rise to an unfair labor practice complaint against the
employer where the employer is deemed to interfere with a protected activity of a
"covered" employee. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1), (a)(3) (1994).
Covered
employees are not supervisory, not independent contractors, and not agricultural
workers. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994).
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work activity) during working hours and in working areas, while
simultaneously prohibiting the discussion of working conditions, the
solicitation of union authorization cards, or the distribution of
union literature in non-working areas."
How should the traditional labor law rules regarding
solicitation and distribution of union material be applied to e-mail
communications? The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
permits oral solicitation while on work premises, during non-work
time.'6 In contrast, distribution of written materials may be
restricted to non-work areas by employers.17 The even stiffer rules
for non-employee distribution involve a balancing of whether

alternative means of communication exist in order to require an
imposition upon the employer's private property rights.'8 The nonemployee is viewed as a trespasser, and for the employer who limits
other non-business solicitation and/or distribution of literature,
there is generally no need to permit strangers to trespass. 9 Once
some non-employees, or non-business invitees are allowed on the

employer's property for solicitation, there will be scrutiny of the
employer's
reason for excluding
non-employee
union
representatives."

Whether employee use of e-mail to solicit

support or distribute information may be restricted under these
traditional oral/written and employee/stranger tenets will be
considered next, as well as whether restricting employees use of email to business only solves the employer's liability concerns under
Section 7 of the NLRA.'
15. See Broder, supra note 13, at 1652 n.61 (discussing how Section 7 rights
prevent an employer from banning statutorily protected activity on company
property if employer allows other non-work uses of its property).
16. Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 619 (1962).
17. Id. This is at least in part because it may litter the employer's premises
and possibly alarm customers in some fashion. See also Le Tourneau Co., 54
N.L.R.B. 1253 (1944), enforcement denied, 143 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1944), rev'd, 324
U.S. 793 (1945) (holding a nondiscriminatory application of a no distribution rule
to employees who were distributing union literature in company parking lot an
unreasonable impediment to organization, given layout of area surrounding plant).
18. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105,112 (1956) (prohibiting
non-employee organizers from distributing literature in company parking lots in
light of alternative means of communication available); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,
502 U.S. 527 (1992) (finding employer's property interests paramount over nonemployee organizer access).
19. See Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112. Some exceptions do not exist under state
law. In California, for example, shopping center owners are not free to exclude
solicitors. See Bristol Farms, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 437, 439 (1993) (holding union
organizers privileged to solicit under state law and, thus, United States Supreme
Court's decision in Lechmere not applicable).
20. See Malin & Perritt, supra note 13, at 44.
21. While not the subject of this paper, employer policies regarding employee
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III. Business Use Only Policies
Do business use only policies for e-mail communications make
sense at work?22 Most employees use their workplace e-mail
systems for both personal and business use. Even though workplace e-mail systems are generally company property, employees

expect that their personal communications on these systems will
remain private. However, in many cases, they will be mistaken as

employers often do monitor employee e-mail (while protecting
themselves from claims of invasion of privacy by notifying
employees of such monitoring up front).23 The trail left by e-mail
messages, even unsent drafts, that may be recovered, has driven at
least one wary firm to prohibit its investment bankers from using email at work.24 While such a decision certainly eliminates recovery
of damaging information during the discovery phase of a lawsuit, it
also results in the loss of an efficient tool for communication in the
workplace.
Employer policies that limit employee e-mail use to business

purposes may solve some problems, including keeping employees

internet use are a related issue in terms of unfair labor practice scrutiny. Are
employees free to surf the web for the cheapest air fares for personal trips, or to
find golf courses located near a business junket, while at the same time being
prevented from viewing union web sites?
22. See Michael J. McCarthy, Sympathetic Ear, Your Manager's Policy on
Employees' E-Mail May Have a Weak Spot, Labor Board Takes on Rules that
Restrict Discussion of Workplace Concerns, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2000, at Al
(discussing Pratt& Whitney case where company was "forced to back off a blanket
policy barring use of e-mail for non-business purposes"); Allegra Kirsten Weiner,
Note, Business-Only E-Mail Policies in the Labor OrganizingContext: It Is Time to
Recognize Employee and Employer Rights, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 777 (2000)
(arguing for classifying e-mail as distribution rather than solicitation so that
employer property rights in its system will be protected).
23. See Tamara Loomis, E-mail Gets Companiesin Litigation Hot Water, Clear
Corporate Guidelines Can Prevent Problems; One Employer Orders Abstention,
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 12, 2001, at B9 (discussing American Management Association
report that nearly forty percent of major U.S. companies monitor employee email); News, Employment Policies: Employers Watching Computer Use for Legal
Liability, AMA Survey Finds, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 153, at A-5 (Aug. 9,
2001) [hereinafter Employers Watching Computer Use] (discussing survey of U.S.
companies where forty-seven percent reported storing and reviewing employees'
e-mail messages with legal liability cited as the most important reason for
monitoring); Lisa Guernsey, Management: You've Got Inappropriate E-Mail:
Monitoring of Office E-Mail Is Increasing,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2000, at Cl (noting
that e-mail servers do not have unlimited space, and thus employers monitor the
network with software, partly to avoid abuse and clogging the network with
personal messages).
24. Loomis, supra note 23; Employers Watching Computer Use, supra note 23;
Guernsey, supra note 23.
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on task while at work, but such bans on e-mail usage may create
other legal problems. A carefully delineated e-mail policy will put
employees on notice as to what types of conduct exceed the
boundaries of proper business use, and what may be grounds for
discipline or discharge. E-mail can be an efficient means of
communication but if employees use the system to chat and
malinger, to improperly harass or defame others, or to divulge trade
secrets, then profits and productivity decline, and employer liability
may ensue. 5 Employer e-mail policies should address these
problem areas but also be implemented with attention to potential
labor law strictures.
IV. Labor Law Issues and Workplace E-Mail Policies
A. NLRB Decisions
The National Labor Relations Board has addressed complaints
about employer e-mail policies or employer reactions to employee
e-mail use in several cases involving concerted activities. In 1993,
the Board upheld an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) finding
that an employer policy that prohibited employee access to the email system for union purposes, while allowing many other nonwork uses of the e-mail system, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA 6 The case of E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co. also involved
Section 8(a)(2) charges. 27 The employer had authorized employee
committees, and these company-dominated committees were
permitted e-mail access.'
The case followed traditional nondiscrimination labor law theory. An employer policy may not
single out a union purpose as being prohibited when other non29
work uses are being permitted on the medium of communication.
It is important to note that the ALJ's opinion in the du Pont case
specifically excluded a ruling that the union would be entitled to

25. One down side of limiting workplace e-mail to business use only is that for
some employees, e-mail may be an efficient and less intrusive way than using the
telephone to keep tabs on family members.
26. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 898 (1993); 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(1) (1994).
27. E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 909.
28. Id. at 895, 918. There were also Section 8(a)(5) issues involved in
bypassing the union by dealing directly with the safety and fitness committees
regarding working conditions. Id. at 918.
29. See Broder, supra note 13, at 1652 (noting that the type of "differential
treatment often indicates anti-labor animus and constitutes discrimination against
labor activity, in violation of the Act.").
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use the e-mail system absent the other non-work use of the system. 3°
In addition, the ruling focused on employee use versus stranger
access to the system. 3 1 The Board's decision and order in du Pont

limited "the remedy to discriminatory prohibition of the use of the
electronic mail system for distributing union literature and
notices. 32
In 1997, the National Labor Relations Board issued a decision
in Timekeeping Systems, Inc., a non-union e-mail case that has far-

reaching implications for employer e-mail policies.33 Computer
programmer Lawrence Leinweber was terminated because of his email response to a memo from the company's chief operational
officer, Barry Markwitz. Markwitz outlined a new proposed plan

for an incentive based bonus system, as well as changes to company
vacation policy that were touted as providing employees "more
days off each year, compared to our present system."34 Markwitz
30. E.L du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 919.
31. Id. The AU made clear that the finding of discriminatory treatment
pursuant to the rule prohibiting employees from using the electronic mail system
for distributing union literature and notices was bounded by the circumstances of
this case. Administrative Law Judge Marion C. Ladwig wrote:
I do not deem it necessary ... to rule on whether the Union would
otherwise be entitled to use this common means of plant communications
for contacting the bargaining unit employees it represents. I do find that
having permitted the routine use of the electronic mail by the committees
and by the employees to distribute a wide variety of material that has
little if any relevance to the Company's business, the company
discriminatorily denies employees use of the electronic mail to distribute
union literature and notices.
Id. The ALJ in E.I. du Pont limited the decision to the issues presented, in
contrast to Adtranz, discussed infra notes 50-69 and accompanying text.
For an interesting twist on the usual issues involving e-mail access for
organizational purposes, see Lockheed Martin Skunk Works v. Moreland, 331
N.L.R.B. No. 104, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 463 (July 24, 2000). There, a bargaining
unit employee filed a decertification petition, and the employer did not inhibit the
petitioner's use of the e-mail system for campaigning purposes. Id. at *2-3. This
was consistent with the employer's "general practice of allowing its employees
wide latitude in using its e-mail system for non-business purposes." Id. at *18.
Upon request, the union was given access to do a mass mailing. Id. at *6-7. When
the union lost the election, they filed objections, complaining that the employer's
e-mail policy interfered with free choice. Id. at *1, 14. The NLRB refused to set
the election aside, noting that the union apparently preferred traditional methods
of communication prior to its one use of the e-mail system. Id. at *16. The
employer had allowed the union access via direct solicitation, interoffice mail,
posting of union literature on plant bulletin boards, and the one requested mass email. Id. at *17.
32. E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 893 n.4 (citing Storer Comms., 294 N.L.R.B.
1056, 1099 (1989)).
33. 323 N.L.R.B. 244 (1997).
34. Id. at 245-46. The president of the company, Barry's father, George
Markwitz, was "essentially inactive in the business." Id. at 245.

20021

EMPLOYER E-MAIL POLICIES

sent his memo by e-mail and told employees that with respect to the
incentive plan "reply with your comments or stop by to see me. A
response to this is required."3 5 Markwitz indicated that with respect
to changes in the3 6vacation policy "[y]our comments are welcome,
but not required.
Leinweber wrote first to Markwitz by an individual e-mail,
demonstrating that in fact the vacation proposal would result in the
same number of vacation days and that it provided less flexibility.37
Markwitz did not reply to this e-mail.3 8 When another employee,
Tom Dutton, sent an e-mail to Markwitz, copied to others,
including Leinweber, that indicated that the vacation plan was
"GREAT!," Leinweber then sent an e-mail to all employees that
began with: "Greetings Fellow Travelers."39 The company memorandum's promise of extra time off pursuant to the new plan was
"proven false" pursuant to Leinweber's own calculations in his
memorandum to all.4° Thereafter, co-worker Dutton sent a new email indicating that he changed his comment to "Not so Great" on
the proposed vacation policy. 1 Markwitz responded by a paper
memorandum to Leinweber that the tone of Leinweber's e-mail42
memorandum "was inappropriate and intentionally provocative.,
He demanded that Lawrence compose a memorandum on a short
deadline reflecting as to "why the e-mail message was inappropriate" and "how sending an e-mail message like this hurts the
company., 43 Markwitz wanted this response, after his review and
acceptance, to be posted on the e-mail to all. Even if Leinweber
complied with this requirement, he would still remain on probation
for six months."
When Lawrence Leinweber did not compose the requested
memorandum, he was terminated 5 While the ALJ ruled that
Leinweber's e-mail had "arrogant overtones," and that he was a
"bit of a wise guy" the conduct of the employer nonetheless
violated Leinweber's right to engage in concerted activity under the

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 246.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 247.
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Act." The ALJ made note of several prior cases where other more

egregious statements within employee letters failed to destroy their
status as being protected concerted activity under the Act.47 The
NLRB adopted the AL's decision, ordering back pay and

reinstatement." Leinweber took the money, but refused to return
41

to the company.
The Board has ventured further since the Timekeeping Systems
decision. In Adtranz, ° a three-member panel of the National Labor

Relations Board affirmed the ALJ's rulings, findings, conclusions,
and modified order. 1 There, the union lost an election among

production and maintenance employees. 2

Objections to the

conduct of the election were filed, and the hearing on objections

was consolidated with an unfair labor practice hearing. 3 The
employer had refused the union's offer of an authorization card
check, and insisted upon a NLRB election." Pending the election,
the employer held meetings with employees.5 During the preelection period, according to the NLRB's General Counsel, the
employer informed employees that the employees would have to

meet certain "new requirements" in order to qualify for an
Employee Incentive Plan. 6 The General Counsel contended that
the employer changed the requirements for qualification to
retaliate against the employees' union activity. 7 The Board found

no violation with respect to the employer's administration of the
incentive plan,, indicating that respondent employer "acted

46. Id. at 249-50.
47. Id. at 249. These included letters referring to supervisors as "a-holes" and
to a chief executive officer as a "cheap son of a bitch." Id. (citations omitted).
48. Id. at 250.
49. See McCarthy, supra note 22, at Al.
50. 331 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 2000 NLRB LEXIS 334 (May 31, 2000), enforcement
denied on other grounds, Adrantz v. N.L.R.B., 253 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
51. The three-member panel included Chairman Truesdale, as well as
Members Liebman and Brame. See id. at *6. Brame dissented, finding that
Respondent's rule against abusive language did not violate Section 8(a)(1). See id.
at *2 n.3.
52. See id. at *7.
53. See id. at *8.
54. Id. at *10.
55. See id. at *10. Such a card check refusal is well within the employer's
rights under the Act, and while it may seem a standard management strategy to
avoid or delay unionization, it does ensure that the safeguards associated with an
NLRB secret ballot election protect employee free choice.
56. Id.
57. See id.
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consistently with its past practice" after the representation petition
8
was filed.
The Board in Adtranz noted, however, that the employer's email rule raised a "novel legal issue."5 9 The employer provided
hardware, software, intranet and Internet e-mail, and an instant
messaging system.' The company had set out a policy that the
corporate e-mail system was for business use only, but employees
nonetheless used the e-mail system for personal communication.61
The AU looked to analogous precedent regarding use of company
bulletin boards and telephones,62 because while there is no statutory
right to use an employer's telephone for personal purposes, if the
employer permits non-business related use, then the employer may
not prevent employees from discussing union activities63 However,
the NLRB General Counsel presented no evidence showing that
the employer "prohibited union discussion on [the] e-mail system,"
and so no unfair labor practice was established. 4 The AL's final
finding was that while the rule on personal discussions via e-mail
was not strictly enforced, "it would be improper to presume that
union discussions would be treated differently.65 Accordingly, I find
that Respondent's E-mail rule is valid and that General Counsel
has not established that the rule was discriminatory [sic] applied."'
The NLRB did not tamper with this statement, as no exceptions
were filed regarding the AID's dismissal of the complaint on the
employer's e-mail rule. 67 The ALJ also noted that pursuant to
established rules on company bulletin boards and telephone use, by
analogy "[r]espondent could bar its computers and E-mail system
to any personal use by employees. '
What does the Adtranz case add to NLRB law on employer email policies? The ALJ's reference to the validity of a business use
only company e-mail policy fell outside the facts of the case, in that
the employer had a written policy limiting use to business, but did
58. Id. at *22.
59. Id. at *16.
60. Id. at *15-16.
61. See id.
62. See id. at *16-17 (citing J.C. Penney, Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 238 (1996);
Guardian Indus. Corp., 313 N.L.R.B. 1275 (1995); Container Corp. of Am., 244
N.L.R.B. 318 (1979)).
63. Id. at *16-17 (citing Union Carbide Corp., 259 N.L.R.B. 974 (1982); KMart Corp., 255 N.L.R.B. 922 (1981)).
64. Id. at *17-18.
65. Id. at *18.
66. Id. at *18-19.
67. See id. at *2 n.1.
6& Id. at *17.
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not enforce the policy. This borderline dicta hardly sets a forceful
or far-reaching precedent in this area. In Adtranz, the failure to

establish discriminatory enforcement of the business use only rule
meant that the ALJ and the NLRB had no basis upon which to find

an unfair labor practice. But, there was an unfair labor practice
shown with respect to the company's no solicitation rule. The no
solicitation/distribution rule was unduly restrictive in that it
required prior authorization by the employer. There, the precedent
and evidence of violation was clear.69 In Adtranz, neither the ALJ
nor the Board referred to pre-existing memoranda from the NLRB

Division of Advice providing direct guidance on employer e-mail
policies and the NLRA.
B. Directionfrom the NLRB Division of Advice

NLRB

Advice Memoranda

provide further insight on

workplace e-mail policies.7' In a 1998 Advice Memorandum regarding Pratt & Whitney, the Board's Division of Advice responded to
three cases in Region 12 where the question was "whether the
employer could lawfully prohibit all non-business use of electronic

mail (E-mail), including employees' messages otherwise protected
by Section 7."71 The employees' computer and e-mail use was
prolific, e-mail being the "main method of communicating;"
moreover, the employer provided access to the system from outside

of the workplace for about ten percent of its employees by the use
of laptop computers." As in Adtranz, although the employer in
Pratt & Whitney had a written policy prohibiting non-business use

of the e-mail system, the policy had not been strictly enforced.7 3
With the onset of a union organizational campaign at the work
69. Id. at *12-13.
70. Pratt & Whitney, 1998 NLRB GCM LEXIS 51 (Feb. 23, 1998); IRIS-USA,
2000 NLRB GCM LEXIS 4 (Feb. 2, 2000). It should be noted that Memorandum
from the General Counsel's office do not have the same precedential value as
Board decisions. Nonetheless, such agency guidance is often given weight by the
courts, as there is a need for answers to particular problems and consistency, and
the officials producing the advice are from the agency most entitled to deference
because of expertise developed by continual exposure to like issues. See
FREDERICK C. HICKS, MATERIALS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH (3d ed.
1942); see generally Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
491 U.S. 299, 322-23 (1989) (Brennan, J. & Marshall, J., dissenting) (indicating that
deference should be afforded to NLRB's general counsel because the general
counsel of the NLRB has "a better understanding than the Court" regarding the
relationship between drug testing and routine physical examinations).
71. Pratt & Whitney, 1998 NLRB GCM LEXIS at *1.
72. Id. at *2-3.
73. Id. at *3.

2002]

EMPLOYER E-MAIL POLICIES

place, several employees were warned and disciplined for sending
union-related messages or downloading information from the
Union's web page onto company computers.74
The question
submitted was solely "whether an employer
can issue a complete
75
ban on all non-business use of E-Mail.,
In answering the question, the Board's Division of Advice
concluded that the employer's prohibition of all non-business use of
e-mail was "overbroad and facially unlawful. 7 6 Communication
that is "expected to occasion a spontaneous response or initiate
reciprocal conversation" was classified as solicitation. 77 One-sided
communication where "the purpose of the communication is
achieved so long as it is received" was defined as distribution." The
Advice Memorandum noted how the Board characterizes circulation of authorization cards and decertification petitions as
solicitation because of the interchange involved rather than mere
receipt of documents.79 In applying the NLRB's Stoddard-Quirk
rule regarding distribution, namely that an employer may limit
distribution of written materials in work areas, the Memorandum
observed that the Board in Stoddard-Quirk also looked to the
employees' interests and found the interests met even if employees
received the material in non-work areas, such as plant entrances or
parking lots.80 Further, the Board in Stoddard-Quirkindicated that
absent the non-work areas for distribution, the usual presumption
that an employer may bar work area distribution might not apply.8
In applying these rules to e-mail technology, the memorandum
from the Division of Advice in Pratt & Whitney identified
computers as a "work area" for employees, as these were areas
where employees were productive.
Both the rules in Stoddard8
3
Quirk and in Republic Aviation dictated that the balance of
interests had been struck such that the employer could not prohibit
74. Id.
75. Id. at *4-5 & n.3.
76. Id. at *5.
77. Id. at *13-14.
78. Id. at *14.
79. Id. (citing Rose Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 228, 229 n.1 (1965); Southwire Co., 145
N.L.R.B. 1329 (1964)).
80. Id. at *12 (citing Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 619 (1962)).
81. Id. at *13 (citing Stoddard-Quirk,138 N.L.R.B. at 621).
82. Id. at *15-16.
83. Republic Aviation v. NLRB, 51 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d
193 (2d Cir. 1944), affd., 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (holding "rule prohibiting union
activity on company property outside of working time constitutes an unreasonable
impediment to self-organization" and unlawful absent special circumstances or
"cogent reason"). Id. at 1187.
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e-mail messages that amounted to solicitation, and indeed such e-

mail messages
conversation.'

were characterized

as very similar to oral

The Memorandum concluded that the employers'

rule banning all non-business use of the e-mail was facially unlawful
and overbroad because it banned oral solicitation and no evidence

was presented of special circumstances making such a rule
necessary in order to maintain production or discipline.85 As a
result of this Memorandum, numerous attorneys who represent
management have since gone on the record as advising employers
against a total workplace ban on personal e-mail.'
A later case analyzed by the NLRB Division of Advice
involved IRIS-USA.87 In the context of a union organizational

campaign and a resulting tie vote, the union filed objections to a
84. Pratt & Whitney, 1998 NLRB GCM LEXIS at *17.
85. Id. at *20. The Pratt & Whitney case was never tried, it was resolved
informally with the company. See Victoria Roberts, Analysis & Perspective,
Employment Policies: Attorneys Say Employees' Use of E-Mail Creating Possible
Legal Pitfalls for Employer, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 130, at C-1, C-3 (July 6,
2000).
86. See Roberts, supra note 85, at C-3. In addition, these attorneys advise that
it is best to confine monitoring to work-related e-mail. Id.; see also Sharon C.
Zehe, BUSINESS FORUM; Beware Abridging E-speech; Blanket Bans on Personal Email and Internet Use Can Lead to Trouble- for Employers, STAR TRIBUNE
(Minn.), July 24, 2000, at 3D (advocating targeting specific problems in e-mail
policy and enforcing consistently).
87. IRIS-USA, 2000 NLRB GCM LEXIS 4 (Feb. 2, 2000). The Associate
General Counsel, Barry J. Kearney, authored both the IRIS-USA Advice
Memorandum and the Pratt & Whitney Advice Memorandum. In the year after
the Pratt& Whitney Memorandum was issued, the Office of the General Counsel,
Leonard R. Page, issued Memorandum GC 99-10 Submission of Advice Cases
(Dec. 22, 1999), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/gcmemo/gc99-10.html, outlining a
list of cases containing a variety of issues that would be required for mandatory
submission to the Division of Advice. These included: "[c]ases involving rules, or
discipline under rules, regarding employee use of employer e-mail, access to the
Internet, or other aspects of using employer-owned means of electronic
communication for Section 7 activities". Id.
At a recent conference, the current General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board, Arthur Rosenfeld responded to this author's question concerning
the ongoing vitality of mandatory submission of e-mail policy questions relating to
Section 7 activities. The question was raised in light of the General Counsel's
discussion of the goals he hoped to set for his first six months in the position. In
particular, he mentioned his intent to review the mandatory submission (to
Advice) list with a view toward simplifying it. Such a move could be viewed as
vesting more discretion in the Regional Directors, but at the same time, GC
Rosenfeld indicated his intent to provide more GC Memoranda to guide the
regions, the bar, and the public on issues. The GC did not indicate any current
plan to delete e-mail policy/concerted activity questions from the mandatory
submission list. Arthur Rosenfeld, Remarks at 30th Annual Joint Labor Law
Conference National Labor Relations Board, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Boston & Mass.
Bar Ass'ns, Suffolk University Law School (Oct. 30, 2001).
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number of the employer's rules, including those regarding
confidential information, a no solicitation rule, and rules regarding

use of e-mail and voicemail. 8 The Division advised Region 32 that
the employer's ban on solicitation was lawful because it only
prohibited such during work time. 89

The company's handbook

provision restricting systems use to company business was deemed
lawful, because unlike the Pratt & Whitney work situation, IRIS-

USA employees did "not use E-mail or computers as part of their
regular work, a 'computer work area' in fact does not exist for
them." 9 Thus, the rule did not restrict a "work area" use in an
overbroad manner.91 In another advice case cited within IRIS-USA,
that of TU Electric, a rule prohibiting the use of company software

for other than company business was problematic because the
employer's E-mail network was used sufficiently that it did

constitute a "work area.

'9

In TU Electric, it was estimated that an

employee worked about one hour on the e-mail system per day. 9'
Employees at TU Electric used e-mail to communicate with each
other and with management, and announcements and required

reading for employees were found there.94
V.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The NLRB itself, as well as the Courts, should speak more
expansively to the issue of the impact of employer e-mail policies
upon employee rights to engage in concerted activity. 9 Meanwhile,

88. IRIS-USA, 2000 NLRB GCM LEXIS at *1.
89. Id. at *5-6.
90. Id. at *9.
91. Id. at *9-10.
92. See id. at *8-9 (citing TU Elec., Case 16-CA-19810, 1999 NLRB GCM
Mem. (Oct. 18, 1999)). A later Advice Memorandum concerning the same
employer found that TU's "Integrity and Ethical Standards-Computer and
Software" policy was unlawfully overbroad. See TU Elec., Case No. 16-CA-19895,
1999 NLRB GCM LEXIS 20 at *5 (Nov. 16, 1999). However, their "Conduct in
the Workplace-Respect in the Workplace" policy was facially lawful, permitting
the employer to discipline an employee who, in the context of an e-mail that was
otherwise protected under Section 7, referred to a supervisor as "Bozo Bob." See
id. at *9.
93. See IRIS-USA, 2000 NLRB GCM LEXIS at *8-9 nn. 5-7 (citing TU Elec.,
1999 NLRB GCM LEXIS 20.)
94. Id. at *9 n.6.
95. See generally Susan J. McGolrick, New Bush Administration Means
Republican Appointments for Top NLRB Posts, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at
S-16 (Jan. 25, 2001) (quoting Daniel V. Yager, Vice President and General
Counsel of LPA Inc., a pro-management group, that despite "NLRB's Advice
Division addressing e-mail issues in specific cases, until these issues are resolved by
the Board and by the courts, people have to act at their peril").
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employers are left to read between the lines of E.L du Pont,
Timekeeping Systems, and Adtranz, as well as to attempt to follow
the guidelines set forth in memoranda from the NLRB's Division of
Advice.
The bottom line appears to be that where employee use of
workplace e-mail is significant enough for it to constitute a "work
area," employers may not totally restrict employee e-mail that is
equivalent to oral solicitation, which is protected by Section 7 of the
Act. The Pratt & Whitney Advice Memorandum made clear that
"special circumstances that make such a prohibition necessary in
order to maintain production or discipline" will not be met by the
"minimal burden placed upon an employer's computer network by
such electronic traffic."96 A total ban on non-business use of the email system is thus not the answer to potential labor law violations
in all cases. This is especially true where employees rely on the email as a significant avenue of communication, and where they do
not otherwise work in close physical proximity.97
As far as the Board's solicitation/distribution dichotomy is
concerned, it seems that the definition of solicitation relies on a
probability of interchange, or interaction. If the purpose of an email communication is met by the mere receipt of documents
without an expectation of a reciprocal response, the communication
will likely be classified as the dead end of distribution. 9 E-mail fits
the definition of oral solicitation in many cases. Even so, it may be
lawful for an employer to ban all non-business use of e-mail on the
employer's system among employees who do not use computers at
work since such a ban would not constitute an overbroad restriction
on a work area.'
Another labor law problem that may arise in the e-mail context
is that of monitoring e-mail, particularly where the onset of such
monitoring occurs at the same time as the onset of union
organizational activities. Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA may be
violated where employees' union activities are subjected to

96. Pratt & Whitney, 1998 NLRB GCM LEXIS 51, at *16-17, *20. See also
NLRB Acting General Counsel Fred Feinstein's Report on Cases Decided from
March 31, 1996 to June 30, 1998, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 172, at E-4 (Sept. 4,
1998) (discussing employer restriction against use of e-mail); NLRB General
Counsel Leonard R. Page's Dec. 14, 2000 Report on Selected Cases of Interest,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 243, at E-1 (Dec. 18, 2000) (discussing employer rules
limiting employee use of company computers and e-mail).
97. See Broder, supra note 13, at 1656-57.
98. See Pratt& Whitney, 1998 NLRB GCM LEXIS at *18-19.
99. See IRIS-USA, 2000 NLRB GCM LEXIS at *8-10.
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management surveillance."° Thus, while the employer must of
course maintain its e-mail system, and prevent abuse of the system,
it should be cognizant of the parameters of labor law when making
changes to its monitoring and/or implementing new restrictions.
The nature and timing of such changes may be deemed to reflect
anti-union animus. Even in the absence of a union, as the
Timekeeping Systems case illustrates, employees are entitled to
engage in concerted activity by e-mail, and should not be
disciplined or discharged for engaging in protected activities that
are deemed to elicit "mutual aid or protection. ''
Perhaps an employer is wisest to promulgate a policy that
notes the e-mail system is primarily for business use but limited
personal use of a lawful nature will be permitted where such does
not overburden the system. What is unlawful should be specifically
outlined in language for the layperson. Employees should be
warned that the system is not private, that it will be monitored for
reasonable business purposes, and that material on the system, even
where the employee believes it is deleted, may generally be
retrieved in the event of its value as evidence in a lawsuit.
Employers should feel free to implement e-mail policies that won't
inhibit employees' legal rights and yet balance the employers'
legitimate business interests.

100. Broder, supra note 13, at 1658 n.100 (citing Auto. Plastic Techs., 313
N.L.R.B. 462, 464-64 (1993) (discussing employer surveillance of union activities
violating Act). See also Montgomery Ward, 269 N.L.R.B. 904 (1984) (using
detectives for surveillance of union activity unlawful).
101. See supra notes 29-50 and accompanying text (discussing Timekeeping
Sys., 323 N.L.R.B. 244 (1997).)

